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ABSTRACT
Civil rights legislation of the 1960s made it illegal foran employer
to pay men and women on different bases for the same work or to discriminate
against women in hiring, job assignment, or promotion. Two decades later,
however, the ratio of women's to men's earnings has shown little upward
movement. Furthermore, major sex differences in occupational distribution
persist with predominantly female jobs typically paying less thanpre-
dominantly male jobs. This negative relationship between wage rates and
femaleness of occupatiop has stimulate4 efforts, in both thejudicial and
political arenas, to establish "comparable worth" procedures for setting
wage rates.
This paper etimates the relationship betweenwages and femaleness of
occupation and finds that it is indeed negative even after controlling for
relevant worker and job characteristics. The magnitude of the relation-
ship, however, implies a surprisingly small effect for a comprehensive
comparable worth policy. The estimates indicate that, even if comparable
worth succeeded in eliminating this negative relatipnship, the disparity
between mean male and female wages would be reduced by well under ten
percent of its current magnitude.
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Civil rights legislation of the early 19605 made itillegal for
an employer topaymen and women on different bases forthe samework or
todiscriminat, against women in hiring, job assignment,or promotion.
Two decadeslater, however•theratio ofwomen' sto men's earnings has
shown little upward movement. Furthermore,major sex differences in
occupational distribution persist with predominantlyfemale jobs
typicallypaying less than prominantly male jobs. For example, in
1983 the percentagesfemale amongtruclcdriversand secretaries were
respectively 3.2 and 99.0, with thetruckdriversreceiving considerably
higherwages. Similar comparisons can bemade of engineers versus
librarians,professors ofeconomics versus professors of art history,
andliterally hundreds of other examples of primarilymen's jobs (Mis)
versus primarilywomen's jobs (Wis).
Such comparisons have generated muchdiscussion, in boththe
judicialandpolitical arenas, concerning the desirability of
establishing"comparableworth" CCW)procedures for setting wage
rates.The presumption underlying the CW movementisthatthe
observednegativerelationship between wage rates and femaleness of an
occupationreflects an "undervaluation"by society of WJs relative to
pus. Accordingly, CW legislation ——eitherpartial (applied to a
particularbranch of governmentand/ora subset of private employers) or
comprehensive ——wouldrequire thatanemployer's wage structure across
'SeeBureau of National Affairs (1981) for a useful review of
the comparable worth doctrine and its relation to existing legislation,
particularly the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Recent progress by the comparable worth movement is summarized in
Goodman (1984).
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jobsbe justifiedby "jobevaluation" procedures. Specifically, each
job within an organization would be assigned points in each ofseveral
dimensions (such as skill requirements,responsibility, effort, and
working conditions), and these scores would somehow beaggregated to an
overall index for determining relative compensation levels.'Under the
presumption that WJs are currently undervalued, a legal requirementthat
relative wage levels be set in this manner, rather thanby the present
cothination of market and institutional forces, wouldtend to reduce the
disparity in the remuneration of MIs and WJs.
The primary object of this paper is to estimate andanalyze the
negative relationship between wage rates and femaleness ofan
occupation. This relationship, which is the empirical basis for CW
legislation, is further discussed and couched in a convenient
econometric framework in Section I. Section IIpresents an empirical
analysis of the relationship, and Section XII explores how the
relationship differs between the public and private sectors. SectionIV
sulmnarizes the implications of the results for CWpolicy.
I.Conceptual Issues
Thepresumed stylized fact that motivates cwproposalsis the
negativerelation, ceteris paribus, between an individual's hourly
earnings (W,which we express logarithmically) and the fraction of
workersin his or her occupation who are women (F).Specifically, we
posit that
20f course, this job evaluation process isextremely problematical. Adetaileddiscussion in Treiman and Hartmann (1981) notesthat 'there are no definitive tests of the 'fairness' of the
choice of compensable factors and the relative weightsgiven to them," and concludes that theprocess is "inherently judgmental."3
(1) W —f(Z,P,S)
whereZisa vectorof characteristics that influence earnings (human
capital, location, working conditions, etc.) and S denotes the
individual's sex. This earnings functionisdepicted in Figure 1. The
vertical axis measures the average log wage rates f or men and women
given their average values of the Z' s. These wages W5are assumed to
be negatively related to F on the horizontal axis.Thefigure as drawn
assumesthat, givenF, men typically earnmorethan women •Thiswould
occurif menhave higher-earning average characteristics or if women are
subject to wage discrimination.
In the framework of Figure 1, one can view the relevant civil
rights provisions of the 1960s as an attempt to move the men's and
women's functions,net of average differences in the Vs,into
confluence.Realization of that goal, however,wouldstill leave women
withlower pay than menbecause women wouldstilltendtobe
concentratedin occupations with larger F. The CW proposals of the
1980s can be viewedasan attempt to remedy this situation by making
3W/aF=O, thatis,by making Figure l's earnings functions horizontal.
Although the sources of the functions' negative slopes are not
the main focus of this paper, they warrant some discussion. The two
most prominent explanations for the negative relationship between wages
and femaleness of occupation are sex differences in preferences and
occupational exclusion.' According to the preferences explanation,
workershaveheterogeneous tastes for ob chararacteristics, and the
3A third explanation is that wages for some WJs, especially
hospital nurses, are depressed because nployers have Inonopsony power.
There is little evidence, though, that this analysis applies to enough
WJs to provide a general explanation.I
distribution of thes, tastes differs between men andwomen. These
gender differences in job preferences might arise fr socialization
concerning sex roles and "apprOpriate" work (the nurse/doctorsyndrome),
differing family responsibilities, or differing expectationsregarding
continuous versus intermittent labor market attachment. Inany case,
such taste differences would lead to sex differences inoccupational
distribution. Furthermore, if the preference distributionswere such
that the supply of workers to female—dominatedoccupations were
especially large relative to the demand, these occupations wouldpay
relatively low wages. In this analysis, the negativerelationship
between wages and feialeness of occupation results fromvoluntary
choices, and the wage structure cannot be "improved" by legislative
fiat. The relative wage changes mandated by a CW policy wouldbe
undesirable on efficiency grounds and not especiallyappealing on equity
grounds.4
Analternative explanationforaw/aFco is thatwomenare
systtically excluded from many occupations and are thus "crowded"
into a subset of occupations with depressedwage rates. •Accordingto
this explanation,womenbecome secretaries, librarians, andart
historiansnot by choice, butbecausethey are blocked from becoming
truckdrivers, engineers, and economists. The employer practices that
wouldleadtosuch occupational exclusion areillegalunder Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, and vigorous enforcement of thatstatute appears
to be a more suitable long—run remedy thanCWlegislation. On the other
hand,eventhe complete elimination of occupational exclusion would
A more formal analysis is presented by Killingsworth (1984).
'See Bergmann(1971, 1974).5
mainly benefit new feiale workers and might be of littlehelp to older
wanan already coraitted to traditionally female careerpaths. CW policy
might then be advocated on equitygrounds asameans ofcompensating the
latter group.
Whatever the source of the negative relationship betweenwages
and femaleness of occupation, the remainder of thispaper attempts to
quantify that relationship and thereby to ascertain thepotential impact
of CW on women's wages relative to men's. We estimate for eachsex the
following linearized version of equation (1),
(2)W= +5F
+
where05 is a vector of parameters (for sex 5) associated with the
characteristics vector Z and £isa disturbance term. For an individual
of sex 5, 5=aw/aFandexp () represents the ceteris paribus wage
ratio between a virtually all-female occupation and avirtually all—male
occupation.' In the present formulation, then, the CW goal of making
can be described as setting
The average log wage for each sex is and the male—
female difference in average log wages is
(3) D —(s;,—n;af)
+(7Jm7fFf
Since the goal of Cl is to eliminate the negative partialrelationship
between wages and femaleness of occupation, we can obtainan upper bound
on CW's relative wage impact by determining how much D would be reduced
if the second term in equation (3) were eliminated bysetting
'Clearly, our empirical specification is influenced by Oaxacas
(1973) seminal paper.6
(The reasons why even comprehensive CW legislation isunlikely to reach
this upper bound will be discussed below.) The nextsection describes
our efforts to estimate the 's and CW's potentialimpact.
II. irical Analysis
To estimate equation (2), we use May 1978 CurrentPopulation
Survey (CPS) data on nonagricultural wage and salary workers, atleast
16 years old, who responded to the supplementaryquestions concerning
their "usual weekly earnings" and "usualweekly hours. -Relativeto
other surveys, the CPS has the advantage of detailedoccupational
information on a large national sample. Relative tosubsequent cs
samples that were asked the supplementary questions, theMay 1978 sample
has the advantages of a larger size and a more "normal"unemployment
situation.
The dependent variable in our regression analyses is thenatural
logarithm of the ratio of usual weekly earnings to usualweekly hours.
This variable, W, averages 1.757 for the 24,056 men inour Sample and
1.346 for the 19,412 women. This implies that D inequation (3) is
l.757—l.346=.4fl, which means that the (geometric) meanwage for women
is 33.7 percent less than that for men. Our goal is toestimate how
much of this wage difference is attributable to femaleness ofoccupation
and howmuch toother factors.
Our femaleness variable, F, is the proportion female in the
individual's three—digit occupation. Whenever possible, thesevalues
were obtained from 1978 CPS data as reported in the January 1979
loyment and Earnings. In occupations for which the CPS cell sizes
were too small to allow publication, we had to extrapolate from 1970
census data. The resulting F variable ranges from less than .01 (for7
such categories as firefighters, autaDobile mechanics, and plumbers and
pipefitters) to over .99(secretariesand housekeepers).
The other variables, comprising the Z vector in equation (2).
are: years of school ccwpleted; potential work experience (age minus
years of school minussix) andits square; regional durilDy variables for
Northeast, North Central, and West; three dunies for residence in a
large, medium, or small SMSA; race dwirnies for black or other minority
race; dunes for voluntary and involuntary part-time work; two marital
status duzmiies, one for married and the other for separated, widowed, or
divorced; number of children and a duny for presence of children;
dunes for union membership and, if not a newber, coverage by a union
contract; a government employment dummy; dummies for 20 major industries
(mining, construction, durable goods manufacturing, etc., with private
households as the omitted category); the traction of workers in the
individual's occupation who worked less than 30 hours in the 1970 census
week; and a series of occupational characteristics indices, developed by
the staff of a National Research Council committee,' describing the
"general educational development," "specific vocational preparation,"
strength, physical demands, and undesirable environmental conditions
associated with the occupation. The corfl.ttee itself acknowledged that
these latter variables are arbitrary and of dubious validity; on the
other hand, they are qualitatively similar to the job evaluation scores
that would be applied under a CW policy and therefore ought to be
controlled for in the estimation of the 7'!.
Indeed,the general question of whether a variable should be
included in the I vector comes down to this issue of whether CW would
'Miller et al. (1960, appendix F).8
allow an ip1oyer to base pay on that variable. For example, the
industry duimnies undoubtedly belong in the regressions because CW would
requir. equal pay f or work of comparable worth only within firms. Wage
differences between firms would not be covered, and a fortiori industry
wage differences would be unaffected. On the other hand, whether union
status belongs in Z depends on whether CW would permit an employer to
pay union workers in one occupation on a different basis than nonunion
workers in another occupation. Presumably, variables such as race and
marital status do not belong in the regressions except as proxies for
other characteristics that employers would be allowed to use. Given the
considerable azithiguity in the choice of Z variables, we will make
careful efforts in the analysis below to clarify how different control
variables affect the estimation of the 's.
We begin by estimating, for each sex, simple regressions of W on
F.The results, which describe the gross relationship betweenwages and
femaleness of occupation, are reported in columns 2 and 5 of Table 1.
Formen, theestimated coefficient for F
m'is —.343, which implies a
.710wage ratio between virtually all—female and all—male occupations.
For women, the estimated coefficientis —.244, implying a .783 wage
ratio. These resultsconfirm Treiman andHartman's (1961) findings from
aggregate data that earnings are negatively related to femaleness of
occupation for both men and women and that the relationship is stronger
among men.
Theseestimates, however, takenoaccount of differences in
workers'characteristics or the characteristics of their jobs. Columns
3 and 6 in Table 1 report the results of estimating multiple regressions
of W on F controlling for the full Z vector described above. In9
general,the estimated coefficients of the control variables are
unrejarkable. It is worth mentioning, though,thatth.coefficient
estimates for schooling and experience appear smaller than most in the
earnings function literature simply because the wage effects of
schooling and experience are partly absorbed by the coefficients of the
"general educational developnent" and "specific vocational preparation"
occupational variables.
What is more striking is that the inclusion of the Z variables
reduces the estimated F coefficients by more than half. Pot men,
controlling for Z reduces the estimated coefficient of F from .343
to 5"—.158; for women, the reduction is from f=.244 to 5=—.O9O. The
new coefficient estimate for men implies a .845 ceteris parthus wage
ratio betweenvirtuallyall—female and all-wale occupations. The new
coefficientestimate for women implies a ratio of .914.
Two important questions arise concerning the interpretation of
these coefficient estimates. First, if we take the multiple regression
estimates at face value, what do they imply about the potential impact
of Cw? As discussed above, CW can be viewed as an attempt to set
and thereby to eliminate the second term in equation (3) f or D,
the male—f ernale difference in average log wages. A simple computation
usingm' and the sample means ofand Ff estimates this term to
be .029, as comparedtoa total D of .411. Given these estimates of the
's, then, even total elimination of aw/aF would reduce D by only about
7 percent. To put it another way, whereas the (geometric) meanwagewas
'The "wrong" sign of some of the other occupational
characteristics' coefficient estimates is a common result (see Brown
(1980)).10
previously 33.7 percent less for .uen than formen, eliminating aw/aF
would merely change this figure to 31.8percent.
Of course, all thisrestson our multiple regression estimates
and If instead we used the simple regression estimates and
we would estimate the second term of D to be .102.Even then, setting
would leave most of D remaining, but the differencefrom the
multiple regression implications is considerable. Thisraises the
second question of how the inclusion of variouscontrol variables
affects the estimation of the 7's. To clarify theinfluences of
different variables, we use the fact (demonstratedin the appendix) that





where the $'s are the estimated coefficients ofthe K control variables
in the log wage regression and thebiF's are the coefficients from
auxiliary simple regressions of the control variableson P. Equation
(4) enables a straightforward decomposition of thedifference 54into
the parts attributable to each control variable.
Table 2 suimnarizes the decompositions for and The
striking finding is that, for both men and women, the bulk ofthe
reduction fromto 5isdue to the industry dunwoy variables. A closer
look at the underlying data reveals the mainreason for this industry
effect: workersin construction and manufacturing(especially durables)
arerelatively well—paid given their other characteristics andare
predominantly male. Once the wage effect of belonging to these11
industries is separately accounted for, the remaining effect of
femaleness of occupation is considerably reduced.
It is crucial to understand that, even if the relation between
wages and femaleness of industry arises from discriminatoryexclusion
practices, CW would not remedy the resulting pay diff stances. As
discussed above, CW would require equal pay for work of comparable value
only within firms. Interindustry wage differences would be unaffected.
Consequently, the smallerestimates from the multiple regression
analyses are clearly better indicators of the potential impact of CW.
Indeed, ifanything,they probably exaggerate OP s impact because they
control only for industry effects and not firm effects. Ia ideal data
base that enabled controls for firm effects as well could also take
account of CW's inability to alter pay differences between firms in the
SaDie industry.'
Although of much less importance than the industry variables, the
duzrny variables for union membership and coverage account for about 15
percent of 4.Thisreflect! the facts that there is a large estimated
union/nonunion wage differential for both men and women and that union
organization is much more prevalent in Itis than in WJs. It is also
interesting to note that the portion of the average log wage
differential between men and women that can be attributed to these union
variablesis .30 x .209 +.03x .113 —.15x .214 —.04x.128=.028.
'Treiman and Hartmann(1981,pp. 39—40) surrmiarize several
studies findings that, within occupations and industries, women tendto
beconcentratedin lower—paying firms. 01 would not address this source
ofwage differences. Indeed, if CW legislation were enacted, its
inapplicability to interfirm differences might be exploited through
business reorganizations. For example, a firmmight "contract out" its
female—dominatedclerical functions to another firm to preclude pay
comparisons with its other job categories.1.2
nearly the same portion that we estimated as Cli's potential impact. In
other words, a policy that (somehow) eliminated the relative wage impact
of union membership and coverage would have about the same effect on the
female/male wage ratio as would economy—wide Cli legislation.
It could certainly be argued that some of the variables included in
Table l's multiple regressions should in fact be excluded. For example,
a stringent CW law might require firms to pay their nonunionized
employees comparably with their unionized employees. If so,the
unionization variables should be excluded from the regressions.
Similarly, although some variables such as those for marital status may
proxy for legitimate determinants of pay, they may not belong in the
regressions in their own right.
Therefore, to check the robustness of our estimates of aw/aF, we
have also estimated a parsimonious model that controls only for
schooling, experience, region, 5)6k, government employment, industry,
and occupational characteristics other than fraction part—time. The
results are very similar to those in the full model. For men, the
estimatedis —.176 (.015), as compared to —.168 in the full model.
For wnen, the estimated 7 is —.085 (.014), as compared to —.090.
Eliminating these 's through CW would reduce D, the male—female
difference in average log wages, by .085 x .71 —.176x .21.023, even
less than the .029 estimated in the full model.
The most important implication of these results is that, since Cli
would not apply across industries (or, indeed, across firms), it is
unlikely to eliminate a major fraction of the disparity between women's
and men's wages. If the model is estimated without the industry dummy
variables, the estimated 75 are somewhat greater, implying greater1.3
effectsfrom QL'• As far aswe know, however, interindustrywage
equalization is beyond the scope of any proposed or imagined CW
legislation.
III. Differences between the Public and Private Sectors
Most of the legislative and judicial activity withrespect to ew
hasbeen in the public sector. Several states and municipalgovernments
have opted or been forced by the courts to adopt 01procedures for
determining pay scales across occupations, and a current bill in
Congress calls for the same in the federal civil service. Legislation
applying CW to the entire economy (i.e., with the samecoverage as the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act) seems at least
several years from enactment. it is, therefore, interestingto see if
the negative ceteris paribus relation betweenwage rates and femaleness
of jobs is stronger in the public than in the privatesector. Is there
an empirical justification for the current concentration of CWactivity
in the public sector?
Table 3 reports the estimated 's when the CPS sample is divided
into public and private employees. The simple andmultiple regression
results in the first two rows are analogous to the full—sampleresults
in Table 1.11 For both men and women, the multipleregression estimates
"In fact, the estimates ofin the full model exclusive of
industry dummy variables are —.210 (.015) for men and —.105 (.013) for
women, not drastically larger than those that do account for industry.
It turns out that the occupational characteristics variablesare rather
highly correlated with industry and thus account for a large portion of the reduction inwhen the industry variables are omitted.
"Onesurprising result inTable 3 is that, for male public
employees, the simple regression estimate of 7is much smaller in
magnitude thanthemultiple regression estimate. Equation (4)'s method
for assessing the influence of various control variables revealslarge
positivevalues of for years of school andthe occupational14
of the 's are indeed larger in the public than the private sector,
although the differences are not statistically significant at
conventional levels. Theseestimates imply that a CW—induced
elimination of ai/awouldreduce 1), the average male-female log wage
differential, by .042 in the public sector and .037 in the private
sector. Both of these figures are larger than our full—sample estimate
of .029, but they are still small relative to the public sector D of
.293 and theprivatesector D of .451.
In the previous section, we argued that estimation of 's should
control for industry effects, but this is not entirely clear in the
public sector. A state government, for example, might declare that its
employees would be paid "comparably" across department lines —-in
public administration, hospitals, transportation, education, etc. To
explore this possibility, the third row of Table 3 reports the public
sector 's estimated without controlling for industry. These estimates
are considerably higher than those with industry controls, and they
imply that eliminating aw/ainthe public sector would reduce that
sector's D by .064. On the other hand, all our public sector estimates
may exaggerate the impact of 0.1 because they do not control for
governmental unit. Even if a state government, for instance,
implemented CW across department lines, it would not have to pay
comparably to the federal government, municipalities, or other state
governments. Just as the previous section's estimates overlook 0.1's
characteristics indices. In other words, male government employees with
more education and higher—earning occupational characteristics tend to
work in occupations with relatively high fractions of women. Thus,
although the simple relation between W and F is small for this group,
the relation becomes much larger when schooling and occupational
characteristics are controlled for.15
inabilityto affectwage differences between firms, thissection's
public sectorestimates overlook Ct?' s inapplicability to
intergovernmental wage differences.
IV. Conclusions
This study has measured the relationship between wages and
femaleness of occupation. When relevant worker and job characteristics,
including industry effects, are controlled for, a negative relationship
between wages and femaleness of occupation still appears, in accordance
with theconcernsof the comparable worth movement. The magnitude of
the relationship, however, implies a surprisingly small effect for a
comprehensive CW policy. Our main estimates indicate that, even if Ct?
succeeded in eliminating this negative relationship, the disparity
betweenmeanmale and female wages would be reduced by well under ten
percent of its current size, and we believe that, if anything, these
estimates overstate CW's impact. These findings may disappoint Ct?
advocates who expect Ct? to achieve drastic changes in the U.S. relative
wage structure; correspondingly, they may soothe the fears of Cli
opponents who view it as the worst idea since minimum wage legislation.
At various points in the paper, we have presented statistical
calculations of CW's potential impact on the male—female wage
differential. These are useful for assessing CliPs initial effects, but
they should not be taken as predictions of its ultimate impact on the
relative earnings of men and women. The most plausible model of Clii's
long—run effects is one in which only a fraction of WJs are covered by
the law. (At present, CW activities are limited to a portion of the
public sector; even a comprehensive Ct? law would, like existing fair
employment legislation, be effectively confined to the public sector16
plus large private firms.) AsKillingsworth(1984) and Ehrenberg and
Smith (1984) have noted, given downward-sloping demand curves, any
policy that raises the wages of covered WJs relative to M3s and
uncovered w3s will lower employment in theformerrelative to the
latter. Thus, CW would raise the wages of covered W3s, lower the wages
of uncovered WJs, and increase the fraction of all tlJs in the low—wage
uncovered sector.'2 Whether wlen in the aggregate would gain or lose,,
either in absolute terms or relative to men, depends on the size of the
relevant diand elasticities."
''This result is similar to those concerning the impact of unionism
and minimum wage legislation in 3obnson and Mieszkowski (1970) and Welch
(1914).
"Recentestimates of multi—factor partial elasticities of
complementarity, as in Grant and Hanermesh (1981), suggest that the
long—run demand elasticities may be rather high, in which case women
would lose froiit CL In addition, unless a comprehensive U'l law
contained strict provisos against "contracting out" (as described in




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table2. Decnposition of the Influenc, of Control
Variables on the Estimation of
Men Women
Total Effect = .175 .153
Decositjon !
Scbooling and experience —.024 .024
Region —.002 —.001
SMSA variables — .015 — .00].
Race .003 .001
Part—time status .019 .009 Marital status i .031 .002
children .003 .001







Occupational characteristics —.034 .012

































Thefull regression model is
W •• +••
Inwhat føllows, it will be convenient to eliminate the constant term by
interpreting all variables as deviations fran sample means. The simple
regression estimator of 7, omitting Z, is then
•





is the vector of coefficients from auxiliary simple regressions of each
Z variable on F. Equation (Al) is equivalent to equation (4) in the
text.
The multiple regression estimator of th. full parameter vectoris
(p= [ (FZ)]-1 (,)
W
F. .
— ( 1—i I 'Z'FZ'Z''Z'W
ApplyingTheil's (1971, p. 18) equation (2.15)for inverses of






















This completes the proof.References
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